October 16, 2025
SEOUL – A few days ago, North Korea held a grand military parade in Pyongyang to mark the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea. On Friday evening, tens of thousands of North Korean soldiers and civilians filled Kim Il Sung Square, moving in perfect formation despite the steady autumn rain. Such parades are typically designed to demonstrate the might of the North Korean military and to send deterrent signals to potential adversaries. However, this year’s parade carried far more complex messages, both domestic and international, that deserve close and serious analysis.
The most striking signal from the parade is the shift in Kim Jong-un’s worldview. For the past three years, Kim had repeatedly emphasized the rise of a multipolar world order. Observing the US-China strategic competition and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, he portrayed the international landscape as one where US-led unipolar dominance had given way to multipolarity, with China and Russia asserting greater influence. But in his recent speeches, including this parade and his Supreme People’s Assembly address in September, Kim refrained from using the term “multipolar world.” Nor did he declare the collapse of the US-led order. Instead, he acknowledged that American hegemony still exists, although it has weakened. This marks a sober and realistic reassessment of the global order, suggesting that Kim is reading the world structure with greater accuracy than before.
This change in worldview has translated into a modification of diplomatic strategy. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kim had sought to position North Korea as a co-leader alongside China and Russia of a “New Cold War” order. Recently, however, his rhetoric indicates a subtle shift. Whereas he once envisioned a tight trilateral bloc among North Korea, China and Russia, he now appears to favor a broader coalition of states that share grievances against the US. His posture has evolved from overt hostility toward Washington to a stance of strategic ambiguity — aligning with countries dissatisfied with US dominance without directly confronting it. Notably, Kim avoided any mention of South Korea, a calculated omission that keeps the door open for potential dialogue under favorable conditions.
A third signal is the evolution of Kim’s personal behavior. His latest speech displayed confidence, composure and a sense of balance — all essential attributes in diplomacy. His voice at the parade was energetic and confident, showing neither agitation nor overstatement. Equally symbolic was the absence of his daughter, Kim Ju-ae. Some experts, including foreign observers, interpreted this as a sign of succession trouble, but such speculation lacks evidence and probability. More plausibly, her absence reflected a decision to maintain proper protocol, as seating a young girl among distinguished foreign guests on the reviewing stand would have been diplomatically awkward.
One day after the parade, Kim publicly expressed gratitude to participants in the parade for enduring the severe weather. Conducting a large outdoor event in considerable rain for more than two hours is an extreme test of endurance, yet Kim’s public apology and appreciation suggested an awareness of public sentiment. Though the decision to proceed despite the rain was reckless and authoritarian in style, his acknowledgment of hardship implied a modest step toward communicative leadership.
Kim has also adjusted how he manages his political legitimacy. His authority rests primarily on traditional legitimacy — inherited through bloodline, rather than charisma or electoral mandate. Such legitimacy, typical of hereditary regimes, is stable but requires constant symbolic reinforcement of continuity with prior supreme leaders. Recently, Kim risked undermining this foundation by rejecting his grandfather’s and father’s long-held ideals of national liberation from “the unjust invasion of imperial countries and peaceful unity between the same ethnic people, instead advocating a doctrine of two hostile states.” Yet during the anniversary celebrations, he reaffirmed his ideological roots by invoking Juche ideology and revolutionary traditions of the Workers’ Party and the Korean People’s Army — an implicit acknowledgment of his lineage-based authority. The previously aggressive effort to craft an independent charismatic image appears to have softened, signaling that Kim better understands the weight and discipline required of state management.
Finally, the parade revealed a dual message on nuclear policy. In his September speech, Kim declared unequivocally that denuclearization is impossible and he would not accept any negotiation for denuclearization. Yet he simultaneously emphasized that the primary obstacle to denuclearization is the “external threat” — implying that if such threats were removed, disarmament, which could connect to the denuclearization, might become conceivable. At the parade, North Korea showcased models of advanced weapons such as the Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile and the hypersonic Hwasong-11ma. Nevertheless, the scale of the nuclear armament display was markedly smaller than in previous parades — less than half of the previous level. Moreover, the Hwasong-20 offered little visible differentiation from the previously unveiled Hwasong-19, suggesting a more restrained approach to military signaling. This moderation likely reflected sensitivity to the presence of Chinese and Russian delegations and could even hint at Pyongyang’s willingness to reengage in negotiations on nuclear issues.
Overall, the messages from Kim Jong-un’s latest parade appear more flexible, moderate and engagement-oriented than before. From Seoul’s perspective, there is no immediate sign of renewed inter-Korean dialogue, yet Kim’s tone suggests that talks could resume if mutual trust is rebuilt. Although the speech contained no mention of US President Donald Trump or any potential North Korea-US dialogue, the combination of rhetoric and visual signaling hints at an openness to future engagement. Kim Jong-un’s evolving stance provides a basis for cautious optimism about future dialogue on denuclearization. Naturally, any such change will be driven by his judgment of what best serves his power and North Korea’s national development. Yet, even self-interested pragmatism can open unexpected opportunities for communication and dialogue. South Korea is no exception. If both Koreas can seize even the smallest opportunities for communication and trust-building, the prospects for reconciliation, exchange and co-existence may gradually reemerge.
Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.
